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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis and the subsequent adverse macroeconomic devel-
opments in advanced market economies have focused the analysis of macro-
economic outcomes on low rates of inflation and low levels of aggregate eco-
nomic activity. Worries have emerged that, in the absence of strong policy
interventions, the economy might be driven into a deflationary trap and de-
flationary expectations. Bullard (2010) has stressed the risk of extended
periods of deflation, sometimes called a liquidity trap. The Japanese econ-
omy seems to have been plagued by such a liquidity trap for nearly two
decades.1 In macroeconomic research these developments have motivated
work that has focused on the possibility of multiple equilibria due to the
zero interest rate lower bound (ZLB) under standard monetary policy rules,
like the Taylor rule. See for example Reifschneider and Williams (2000),
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and
Uribe (2002), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and the more recent work
by Werning (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2014).
This recent literature has explored new types of monetary and/or fiscal
policies that can avoid or escape persistent deflationary outcomes. Such poli-
cies are based on models that strongly rely on the rational expectations hy-
pothesis: Proposed policies make use of announcements, promises or threats
about future policy actions and outcomes, such as policy induced violations
of the transversality conditions in order to avoid falling into the liquidity
trap. Some of these ideas - especially forward guidance in monetary policy
- are now used in actual policy making, e.g. see Bernanke (2012). Others
suggest suitably “irresponsible” fiscal or monetary policies (see e.g. Krug-
man (1998), Chapter 2.4 of Woodford (2003) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe,
and Uribe (2002)), which are controversial as their credibility may be ques-
tionable. More recently, a number of papers have examined the eﬃcacy of
standard fiscal policies, i.e. changes in taxes and/or government spending,
when monetary policy is constrained at the zero lower bound. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Woodford (2011), Eggertsson (2010) and
Braun, Korber, and Waki (2012) assume rational expectations and also that
the economy is pushed to the zero lower bound as a result of a sustained ex-
ogenous negative preference shock, modeled as a two-state Markov process,
1See Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and Svensson (2003) for the
renewed interest in the liquidity trap sparked by the recent Japanese experience.
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with an absorbing value at the normal level, and which therefore disappears
in finite time. In our view this perspective does not do justice to the view of
expectations as having an independent role in macroeconomic dynamics.
Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2014) both
consider sunspot equilibria, again taking the form of a two-state Markov
process, with the normal outcome as an absorbing state. These papers do
consider aspects of expectations formation and learning. The former pa-
per uses learning as a selection device to rule out the sunspot equilibrium.
The latter paper concedes the instability of the sunspot equilibrium under
learning, but looks at the impact of fiscal policy on the learning paths to
the absorbing state leading to the targeted steady state. Christiano and
Eichenbaum (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2014) both use short-horizon
learning based on Euler equations, along lines introduced in Evans, Guse,
and Honkapohja (2008). In the current paper we use infinite-horizon learn-
ing in which agents’ decisions are based on forecasts of inflation and output
over the entire future.
We instead consider situations in which, due to some dramatic adverse
shock to expectations, the economy is in a region in which expectations are
in, or with unchanged policy will enter, the deflation trap region in which
adaptive learning reinforces pessimistic expectations. We consider how to
avoid this trap, characterized by low output and persistent deflation, by
focusing on traditional fiscal policies involving government spending on goods
and services, i.e. policies of fiscal stimulus or austerity. We also retain the
usual monetary policy of the Taylor interest rate rule that assures the local
stability of the economy at the targeted inflation rate.2
We consider two types of fiscal policies. The first type is an announced
increase or cut in government spending on goods that is tuned to the current
macroeconomic situation. Following Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009)
agents are assumed to build into their decision-making the announced path
of government spending. We show that a properly tuned fiscal stimulus is
eﬀective. With the stimulus policy in place, the economy can escape from
the liquidity trap. Surprisingly, in some conditions suitably designed fiscal
austerity can also move the economy out of a liquidity trap. The second
type of successful fiscal policy is instead rule-based, so that an appropriate
increase in government spending is triggered if actual inflation or inflation
2We do not consider other more complex monetary policies that have been used in the
literature on current crisis to address the problems in the functioning of financial markets.
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expectations go below a pre-specified lower threshold for the rate of inflation.
Our analysis relies on the assumption that private agents form their ex-
pectations using adaptive learning.3 4 In other words, in making forecasts
agents act like econometricians who have a forecasting model that in any pe-
riod is estimated using existing data, and updated as new data becomes avail-
able. The state of the economy in any time period is viewed as a temporary
equilibrium for given expectations while the learning process is a sequence
of temporary equilibria that can converge to rational expectations equilib-
rium. We explore policies designed to avoid and escape the ZLB in New
Keynesian (NK) models with agents who form expectations using adaptive
learning rules. We focus on NK models because, from the policy viewpoint
the problem with deflation has been associated with declining output, high
unemployment and/or stagnation.5 For some policies the announcements of
a sequence of policy moves are a key part of policy. Using the techniques in
Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009) these announcements are assumed to
be credible and are thus incorporated into agents’ forecasting.
Analytically, the multiple equilibria problem means that, in addition to
the targeted steady state at the (gross) inflation rate  = ∗ ≥ 1, there is
a low-inflation unintended steady state. If the (gross) interest rate is at or
near the lower bound  = 1, then by the Fisher equation  =  there is
a second, lower, steady state  near , where   1 is the discount factor.
It turns out that under learning dynamics a persistent deflation trap with
 ≤  is possible when policy is described by the usual Taylor rule and
constant fiscal policy.
The intuition for the deflation trap under learning is that if expected
inflation and expected output are below the values corresponding to the low
steady state at , then aggregate demand will be low because the expected
deflation implies high ex-ante real interest rates values. The high real interest
3For discussion and analytical results concerning adaptive learning in a wide range of
macroeconomic models, see for example Sargent (1993), Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
Sargent (2008), and Evans and Honkapohja (2009). For empirical work on learning, see
Milani (2007), Milani (2011), Eusepi and Preston (2011), Slobodyan and Wouters (2012),
and as an overview Section 3 of Evans and Honkapohja (2013).
4Recently, there has been increasing interest in relaxing the rational expectations hy-
pothesis in the context of macroeconomic policy analysis, see e.g. Taylor and Williams
(2010) and Woodford (2013).
5Consequences of the interest rate zero lower bound and the liquidity trap under adap-
tive learning have earlier been studied in Evans and Honkapohja (2005), Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2010).
4
rates, especially if combined with low expected output, lead to low actual
levels of aggregate output and to actual inflation below expected inflation.
Under adaptive learning expectations are revised further downward, pushing
the economy deeper into the deflation trap.
The lack of rational expectations can give scope for wealth eﬀects, like the
traditional Pigou eﬀect, as a stabilizing mechanism. Can wealth eﬀects en-
sure an eventual return to the steady state? The answer depends on specific
aspects of the private agents’ expectations. Evans and Honkapohja (2010)
find deflation traps when agents forecast over the infinite future and perceive
that the transversality condition (TVC) is always met along these disequi-
librium paths. Such consumers are called “Ricardian,” in that they do not
perceive bonds and money as net wealth.6 What about the direct wealth
eﬀects of real money and bonds when households are non-Ricardian? Would
such wealth eﬀects be eﬀective in avoiding deflation traps if households do
not have Ricardian consumption functions? We investigate this issue and
find that wealth eﬀects can eventually return the economy to the ∗ steady
state, but that these mechanisms can be slow, and fail in some cases.7
Our main focus is on fiscal policies. As indicated above, we first consider
policies that implement a temporary fiscal stimulus in the form of govern-
ment spending, or its converse, a policy of temporary fiscal austerity, under
the assumption that future taxes adjust to keep the government solvent in
the long-run. We show that a fiscal stimulus can be eﬀective, i.e. deliver
convergence of the economy to the targeted steady state, if its magnitude is
suﬃcient and its duration is suﬃciently short. Interestingly, a policy of fiscal
austerity, i.e. a temporary cut in government spending can also be eﬀective.
This requires, however, the fiscal austerity period to be suﬃciently long, and
the degree of initial pessimism in expectations to be relatively mild.
One disadvantage of fiscal stimulus and fiscal austerity policies is that
both their magnitude and duration have to be tailored to the initial pes-
simistic expectations, so they require precise discretionary action. A second
more automatic fiscal policy, a fiscal stimulus“switching rule,” can also en-
sure a return to the intended steady state ∗. This policy eliminates the
6In Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2012) it was shown that when expectations are not
fully rational, Ricardian equivalence may or may not hold, depending in particular on the
assumptions concerning the influence of government financial variables on expectations.
7Another mechanism that can prevent a deflationary spiral is a lower bound  on
inflation due to asymmetric costs of price adjustment. However, it still can lead to falling
output, to stagnation, or to a very slow return to the ∗ steady state. See Appendix 2.
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unintended steady state and guarantees that the economy does not get stuck
in a regime of deflation and stagnation. A significant advantage of this rule
is that it is triggered automatically and does not require discretionary fiscal
fine tuning.
2 The Model
We start with the same basic economic framework as in Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2008). There is a continuum of household-firms, which produce
a diﬀerentiated consumption good under monopolistic competition and price-
adjustment costs. There is also a government which uses both monetary and
fiscal policy and can issue public debt as described below.
The objective for agent  is to maximize expected, discounted utility
subject to a standard flow budget constraint:
 0
∞X
=0

µ
 −1  

−1 − 1
¶
(1)
  + +  +Υ = −1−1 +−1−1 −1 +   (2)
where  is the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator,  and  denote
nominal and real money balances,  is the labor input into production,
 denotes the real quantity of risk-free one-period nominal bonds held by
the agent at the end of period , Υ is the lump-sum tax collected by the
government, −1 is the nominal interest rate factor between periods −1 and
,  is the price of consumption good ,  is output of good ,  is the
aggregate price level, and the inflation rate is  = −1. The subjective
discount factor is denoted by . The utility function has the parametric form
 = 
1−1
1− 1 +

1− 2
µ−1

¶1−2
− 
1+
1 +  −

2
µ 
−1 − 1
¶2

where 1 2    0. The final term parameterizes the cost of adjusting
prices in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982).8 The household decision problem
is also subject to the usual “no Ponzi game” condition.
8We use the Rotemberg formulation in preference to the Calvo model of price stickiness
because it enables us to study global dynamics in the nonlinear system. See Ascari and
Rossi (2012) for a comparison of Rotemberg and Calvo models when there is trend inflation.
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Production function for good  is given by
 = 
where 0    1. Output is diﬀerentiated and firms operate under monopo-
listic competition. Each firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve given
by
 =
µ

¶−1
 (3)
Here  is the profit maximizing price set by firm  consistent with its
production . The parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between
two goods and is assumed to be greater than one.  is aggregate output,
which is exogenous to the firm.
The government’s flow budget constraint is
 + +Υ =  +−1−1 +−1−1 −1 (4)
where  denotes government consumption of the aggregate good,  is the
real quantity of government debt, and Υ is the real lump-sum tax collected.9
We assume that fiscal policy follows a linear tax rule for lump-sum taxes as
in Leeper (1991)
Υ = 0 + −1 (5)
where we will usually assume that −1 − 1    1. This restriction on
 means that fiscal policy is “passive” in the terminology of Leeper (1991)
and implies that an increase in real government debt leads to an increase in
taxes suﬃcient to cover the increased interest and at least some fraction of
the increased principal.
Initially we assume that  is constant and given by
 = ¯ (6)
From market clearing we have
 +  =  (7)
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a global interest rate rule
 − 1 =  ¡+1 +1¢  (8)
9Some of the literature cited above allows for labor income taxes. This could be intro-
duced in our set-up but would complicate our model.
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The function ( ) is taken to be positive and non-decreasing in each ar-
gument. The rule (8) is a nonlinear forward-looking Taylor rule, where the
nominal rate is set by the central bank as a function of expected inflation
and expected output.10 We assume the existence of ∗ ∗ and ∗ such that
∗ = −1∗ and (∗ ∗) = ∗ − 1. Here ∗ can be viewed as the inflation
target of the Central Bank, and ∗ is the natural rate of output, i.e. the level
of output compatible with steady state inflation ∗We assume that ∗ ≥ 1.
In the numerical analysis we will use the functional form
( ) = (∗ − 1)
³ 
∗
´∗(∗−1)µ 
∗
¶
 (9)
which implies the existence of a steady state at (∗ ∗). Using∗ = ∗−1we
obtain ∗(∗ ∗) = ∗∗ = −1 We assume that   1. Equations
(6), (5) and (8) constitute “normal policy”.
2.1 Optimal decisions for private sector
In Appendix 1 we derive the following optimality conditions for the consumer-
producer:
0 = − +  ( − 1)
1
 (10)
+
µ
1− 1
¶
 1 
(1−1)

 
−1 − 
1
(+1 − 1)+1
−1 = 
¡−1+1−1+1¢ (11)
and
 = ()12
Ã¡
1−−1
¢ −1
2−1+1
!−12
 (12)
where +1 = +1.
For convenience we make the assumptions 1 = 2 = 1, i.e. utility of
consumption and of money is logarithmic. It is also assumed that agents
have point expectations, so that their decisions depend only on the mean of
their subjective forecasts.
10The main results below would also hold in the case of a contemporaneous-data Taylor
rule, which is used in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008).
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We now proceed to rewrite the decision rules for  and  so that they
depend on forecasts of key variables over the infinite horizon. The infinite-
horizon (IH) learning approach in New Keynesian models was first empha-
sized by Preston (2005) and Preston (2006), and was used in Evans and
Honkapohja (2010) to study the properties of a liquidity trap.11
2.2 The infinite-horizon Phillips curve
Defining
 = ( − 1) (13)
the price-setting Euler equation (10) becomes
0 = − +  
1

+
µ
1− 1
¶
 1 
(1−1)

 
−1 − 
1
+1
Using the production function  =  we get
 = 
(1+)
 −  − 1 
1
 (−1) −1 + +1
and using the demand curve  = ()− gives
 =  ()
−(1+) (1+) − − 1 ()
−(−1)−1 ++1
It is shown in Appendix 1 that the necessary TVC for optimal price
setting implies the condition
lim→∞
 = 0 (14)
Defining
 ≡  ()
−(1+) (1+) −  − 1 ()
−(−1)−1 
11In the literature on learning and bounded rationality it is often assumed that agents
have a short (one-period) decision horizon. Then Euler equations provide directly the
relevant decision rules. Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) applies the Euler-equation
approach to the analysis of liquidity traps.
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iterating the Euler equation yields
 =  +
∞X
=1
+ (15)
by using the limit condition + → 0 as  →∞. This last condition is
implied by (14). We remark that the variable + is a mixture of aggregate
variables and the agent’s own future decisions.
At this point there are alternative ways to proceed. One approach em-
phasized by Eusepi and Preston (2010) is to assume that agents choose 
as part of the optimal plan given expectations about the future values of
variables that are exogenous to them.12 We take a diﬀerent approach mo-
tivated by the agents’ knowledge of observed empirical relationships that
hold in temporary equilibrium. It is assumed that at time  agents fore-
cast aggregate inflation + and aggregate output + using an adaptive
learning rule that is discussed below. In addition, we make some further
adaptive learning assumptions that involve their own future decisions and
expected future aggregate variables. In particular, agents are assumed to
have learned from experience that, in temporary equilibrium, it is always the
case that  = 1 and also  =  −  in per capita terms. These two
relationships necessarily hold in temporary equilibrium because agents have
been assumed to be identical (though agents themselves do not need to know
this). Therefore, we assume that agents impose these relationships in their
forecasts in (15), i.e. they set (++) = 1 and + =  + − +
for  ≥ 1. In the case of no policy change the latter assumption becomes
+ =  + − ¯.
Recalling the assumptions of point expectations and log utility of con-
sumption gives
 =  +
∞X
=1
+, where
+ = 
¡ +¢(1+) −  − 1  +( + − ¯)−1
Finally, assuming homogeneous expectations and imposing symmetry, i.e.
all agents are in identical situations so that  =  = ,  =  and in
12To implement this approach they linearize the model around the intended steady state.
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addition −1 = −1 for all  (note that  = ()(−1−1) so
that  = , and  = ), we obtain
 = 
(1+)
 −  − 1 ( − ¯)
−1 + (16)


∞X
=1
−1 ¡+¢(1+) −  − 1
∞X
=1

µ +
+ − ¯
¶

which defines the temporary equilibrium value for . In order to have a
monotonic relationship between  and , the appropriate root for given 
is  ≥ 1
2
and so we need to impose  ≥ −1
4
to have a meaningful model. We
will treat (16), together with (13), as the temporary equilibrium equations
that determine  given expectations {+}∞=1. Later, we will consider a case
where  varies over time and then + − ¯ becomes + = (+ − +)
in equation (16).
2.3 The consumption function
To derive the consumption function using the IH-learning approach, the first
step is to use the flow budget constraint and the NPG (no Ponzi game) to
obtain an intertemporal budget constraint. First, we define the asset wealth
 =  +
as the sum of holdings of real bonds and real money balances and write the
flow budget constraint as
 +  =  −Υ + −1 + −1 (1−−1)−1 (17)
where  = −1. Note that we assume () = , i.e. the rep-
resentative agent assumption is being invoked. Iterating (17) forward and
imposing
lim→∞(
+)−1+ = 0 (18)
where
+ =
Y
=1
+
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with + = +−1+, we obtain the life-time budget constraint of the
household
0 = −1 + Φ +
∞X
=1
(+)−1Φ+ (19)
0 = −1 +  −  +
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+ − +) (20)
where
Φ+ = + −Υ+ − + + (+)−1(1−+−1)+−1 or (21)
+ = Φ+ + + = + −Υ+ + (+)−1(1−+−1)+−1
Here all expectations are formed in period , which is indicated in the notation
for + but is omitted from the other expectational variables.
From the consumer’s perspective equation (18) is related to the transver-
sality condition requiring the discounted value of assets  to go to 0 as
→∞. Some earlier papers (see Chapter 2.4 of Woodford (2003) and Ben-
habib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002)) explore commitments to combina-
tions of fiscal and monetary policies that rule out paths that satisfy Euler
equations but that do not converge to the targeted steady state as possible
equilibria because they violate the consumers’ transversality conditions. Our
approach is diﬀerent. We use fiscal policies involving government spending on
goods and services to directly aﬀect aggregate expenditures. In our adaptive
learning context these policies generate inflation and interest rate trajectories
that exclude paths where inflation falls below a specified threshold, and in
particular they can avoid deflationary paths.
Returning to optimization of consumption we have
−1 = +1(+1)−1, where +1 = +1, and (22)
under the assumption of a representative agents and identical expectations.
The consumption Euler equation (22) implies the relations
+ = + (23)
and we obtain
(1−)−1 = −1+−Υ+−1(1−−1)−1+
∞X
=1
(+)−1+ (24)
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As + = + −Υ+ +(+)−1(1−+−1)+−1, the final term in (24) is
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+ −Υ+) +
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+)−1(1−+−1)+−1
and using (12) with the representative agent assumption we have
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+)−1(1−+−1)+−1
=
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+)−1(−+−1+−1) = − 1−  
and so
1 + 
1−  = −1 +
−1
 +  −Υ +
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+ −Υ+)
Finally, we invoke the flow budget identity ++Υ− = −1−1 +−1,
see (4), and obtain the consumption function

∙
1 + 
1−  − 

 − 1
¸
=  +  −  +
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+) (25)
where + = + −Υ+.
The derivation of the consumption function (25) has assumed households
that do not act in a Ricardian way, i.e. they do not impose the intertemporal
budget constraint (IBC) of the government. We next turn to the case of
Ricardian consumers.
2.4 The Case of Ricardian Consumers
For Ricardian consumers we modify the consumption function as in Evans
and Honkapohja (2010).13 From (4) one has
 + +Υ =  +−1−1 + −1 or
 = ∆ + −1 where
∆ =  −Υ − +−1−1 
13Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2012) state the assumptions under which Ricardian
Equivalence holds along a path of temporary equilibria with learning if agents have an
infinite decision horizon.
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By forward substitution, and assuming
lim→∞+ + = 0 (26)
we get
0 = −1 +∆ +
∞X
=1
−1+∆+ (27)
Note that ∆+ is the primary government deficit in + , measured as gov-
ernment purchases less lump-sum taxes and less seigniorage. Under the Ri-
cardian Equivalence assumption, we assume that agents at each time  expect
this constraint to be satisfied, i.e.
0 = −1 +∆ +
∞X
=1
(+)−1∆+ where
∆+ = + −Υ+ −+ ++−1(+)−1 for  = 1 2 3    
A Ricardian consumer assumes that (26) holds. His flow budget con-
straint (17) can be written as:
 = −1 + , where
 =  −Υ − −  + −1 −1
The relevant transversality condition is now (26). Iterating forward and using
(23) together with (26) yields the consumption function
 = (1− )
Ã
 −  +
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+)
!
 (28)
where + = + − +. For more details see Evans and Honkapohja
(2010).
3 Temporary Equilibrium and Learning
3.1 Equilibrium Conditions
We now come to the formulation of learning (see footnote 3 for general ref-
erences on adaptive learning). In general, in adaptive learning it is assumed
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that each agent has a model for perceived dynamics of state variables, also
called the perceived law of motion (PLM), to make his forecasts of relevant
variables. In each period the PLM parameters have been estimated using
available data and the estimated model is used to compute forecasts. The
PLM parameters are then re-estimated when new data becomes available in
subsequent periods. A common formulation is to postulate that the PLM is
a linear regression model where endogenous variables depend on intercepts,
observed exogenous variables and possibly lags of endogenous variables. The
estimation would then be based on least squares or related methods. The re-
gression formulation cannot be applied here because there would asymptotic
perfect multicollinearity in the current non-stochastic setting.14 We therefore
assume that agents form expectations using so-called steady state learning,
which is formulated as follows.
Steady-state learning with point expectations is formalized as
+ =  for all  ≥ 1 and  = −1 + (−1 − −1) (29)
for  =    . Here  is called the “gain sequence,” and measures
the extent of adjustment of estimates to the most recent forecast error. In
stochastic systems one often sets  = −1 and this “decreasing gain” learning
corresponds to least-squares updating. Also widely used is the case  = ,
for 0   ≤ 1, called “constant gain” learning. In this case it is usually
assumed that  is small. Stability of the steady states is examined below
using the simple learning rules just described.
The temporary equilibrium equations with steady state learning are as
follows. In presenting them we must distinguish between the cases of Ricar-
dian and non-Ricardian consumers.
1. The aggregate demand relation. In the non-Ricardian case
 =  +
 +  −  +
X∞
=1(+)−1
(1− )−1(1 + )− [ (   )]−1[1 +  (   )]
=  +  +  −  + 
 [1 +  (   )−  ]−1
(1− )−1(1 + )− [ (   )]−1[1 +  (   )]
≡  + (       ) (30)
14See Evans and Honkapohja (1998) or Section 7.2 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for
discussions of learning in deterministic and stochastic models.
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where we have assumed that agents know the interest rate rule.
For the case of Ricardian consumers this equation is replaced by  =
 + , where  is given by (28). This leads to equation (40), given in
the next section.
2. The nonlinear Phillips curve
 = −1[˜( +1 +2)] (31)
≡ −1[(  )]
≡ 2(  )
where
() ≡ ( − 1) (32)
(  ) ≡ 
µ
−1(1+) −
¡
1− −1¢ 
( − )
¶
(33)
+


µ
(1− )−1
µ
−1( )(1+) −
¡
1− −1¢ 
¶¶

and where until Section 4 we assume that  =  − ¯
3. Bond dynamics
 + =  −Υ + −1 −1 +
−1
  (34)
4. Money demand
 =   − 1 (35)
5. Interest rate rule
 = 1 +  (   ) .
The state variables are −1, −1, and −1. The system in general has
four expectational variables: output  , inflation  , income net of taxes 
and net output  . In cases where government spending is constant we
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have  =  − ¯, so that it is not necessary to introduce expectations of
net output separately. The evolution of expectations is given by
 = −1 + (−1 − −1) (36)
 = −1 + (−1 − −1) (37)
 = −1 + (−1 − −1) (38)
 = −1 + (−1 − −1) (39)
where equation (38) is used only in cases when the households are Non-
Ricardian.
3.2 Dynamics under standard policies
3.2.1 The case with Ricardian consumers
We now consider the case where government spending is constant  = ¯.
In this case we can assume that + = + = + − ¯. For simplicity,
in this section we drop the dependence of the interest rate rule on expected
output so that  = 0 and  = 1+ () Using this and the steady-state
learning assumption in (28), the market-clearing equation  =  +  gives
the aggregate output equation
 = ¯ + (−1 − 1)( − ¯)
µ 
1 + ()− 
¶
(40)
≡ 1(  )
The temporary equilibrium is now given by the Phillips curve (31), the out-
put equation with Ricardian consumption function (40) and the independent
equation for the evolution of debt and money. Note that the Ricardian sys-
tem just depends on expectations of output and inflation, so that the paths
of inflation and output do not depend on the evolution of bonds and real
balances. The (small gain) dynamics can therefore be described by the E-
stability diﬀerential equation using a two-dimensional phase diagram. (See
e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a discussion of E-stability.)
The E-stability diﬀerential equations are given by

 = 1(
 )−  (41)

 = 2(
 )− 
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where using (31) we define 2( ) = 2(1( ) ). The steady state
equations for   and  are
 =  − ¯
−1+ +  (1− ) ( − 1) + 
µ
1− 1
¶
−1 = 0
1 + () = −1
Steady states are defined by  = 1 + () together with the the Fisher
relationship  = −1. For   1 there are two steady states, (∗ ∗) and
( ) with   ∗. Local E-stability results for the Ricardian case are
given by Proposition 2 of Evans and Honkapohja (2010): the ∗ steady state
is locally stable under learning, while for small , the  steady state is
locally unstable under learning, with the local learning dynamics taking the
form of a saddle.15
One can also look at the global learning dynamics using a phase diagram
of system (41). The dynamics in the phase diagram approximate the discrete
real-time paths of steady state learning when the gain  is small. For typical
parameter values the learning dynamics are shown below in Figure 1. The
figure is constructed with the following parameter values  = 25, ∗ = 102,
 = 099,  = 07,  = 350,  = 21,  = 1, and  = 02. While  = 15 is the
usual value for the interest rate rule in the literature, we choose  = 25 to
clearly separate the intended and unintended steady states in the numerical
analysis (our results are robust to using  = 15).
The calibrations of the target inflation rate ∗ the discount factor  the
labor share  and the approximate GDP share of government spending, 
are standard. We set the labor supply elasticity  = 1. To calibrate ,
we exploit the relation of the Rotemberg and the Calvo models of costly and
sticky price adjustments via their reduced form implications for the linearized
Phillips curve. As shown by Keen and Wang (2007), using our notation we
can express  = (−1)
(1−)(1−) where 1− is the fraction of firms changing their
price during the quarter. Following Basu and Fernald (1997) we calibrate
 = 21, implying a conservatively estimated 5% markup. To calibrate  we
use the estimate of Kehoe and Midrigan (2010), p. 8 for the frequency of
15Instability of the low inflation steady state under learning and the divergent paths were
earlier described in McCallum (2002), Eusepi (2007), and Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008). Bullard and Cho (2005) show the possibility of “escape paths” toward the low-
inflation outcome.
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regular price changes from BLS data, excluding temporary changes in price
that quickly revert to their older trend level. Kehoe and Midrigan find this
frequency to be 145 months or 48 quarters, implying that the percentage of
firms not changing prices is during a quarter is  = 07916 Using the formula
above we obtain  ≈ 350 for our calibration. The literature contains a range
of estimates for the value of  and  and thus one could have alternative
calibrations to our model. Our qualitative results are robust to diﬀerent
calibrations.
We also assume that interest rate expectations + = +−1+ re-
vert to the steady state value −1 for  ≥  . This truncation is needed for
technical reasons to prevent agents forecasting negative real interest rates
indefinitely, which would imply unbounded consumption. For the long run,
it is also plausible that consumers would make this assumption. In Figure 1
we use  = 28 which under a quarterly calibration corresponds to 7 years.16
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Figure 1: Global learning dynamics — the Ricardian case.
The main features that stand out are, first, the local stability of the tar-
geted steady state at (∗ ∗) ≈ (102 09440). There is in fact a “corridor
of stability” defined by a set of initial expectations that converge to the ∗
steady state. (The term “corridor” is due to Leijonhufvud (1973).) This
corridor is defined by the region enclosed within the stable manifold of the
unintended steady state ( ) ≈ (09931 09429). The intuition for the lo-
cal stability of the targeted steady state under learning is that if, say, ( )
16This choice is roughly in line with data on the aftermath of financial crises. See
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009).
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is somewhat below steady-state values then the locally active Taylor rule re-
duces interest rates enough to reduce ex-ante real interest rates, stimulating
output, which increases inflation. Under adaptive learning expectations will
then be revised upward.
Second, we see that convergence to ∗ is locally cyclical: when expec-
tations diﬀer from the intended steady state, the adjustment under normal
policy, with adaptive learning, has gradually convergent cyclical dynamics.17
We will see that this phenomenon cannot eliminated by the fiscal policies
that we consider. The extent of cycling does vary with alternative policies
for avoiding deflation traps. However, the design of policies to minimize this
cyclical dynamics is not our objective in the current paper. Third, it can be
seen that there is a heteroclinic orbit connecting the  steady state with
the ∗ steady state.
Fourth, and most strikingly, we observe that for initial points outside the
corridor of stability the trajectory of expectations is (at least eventually) led
into a deflation trap in which ( ) fall steadily over time. Along these
paths we have falling actual output and inflation, intensifying as deflation
sets in. The intuition for these paths is that if, say, ( ) are somewhat
below the low steady-state values ( ), then we are in the liquidity trap
region near the ZLB in which there is negligible room to reduce nominal
interest rates. However, the real rate is positive and indeed above −1 due
to the expected deflation. These high real interest rates, combined with low
, lead to low levels of aggregate demand and low output, and through the
Phillips curve to actual inflation below expected inflation. Under adaptive
learning expectations of inflation and output are revised further downward,
preventing escape from the deflation trap.
Finally, note that even though the financial wealth of agents is getting
very large over time along such a deflationary path, Ricardian agents do
not respond by suﬃciently increasing consumption, as they expect that this
increase in wealth will be oﬀset by future growth in taxes. Thus in the
Ricardian case, wealth eﬀects do not lead to an escape from the deflation
trap.
17We remark that under perfect foresight the adjustment paths would also typically be
cyclical in response to a temporary fiscal stimulus.
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3.2.2 Wealth Eﬀects and Non-Ricardian Consumers
We next consider Non-Ricardian consumers. A traditional argument against
the liquidity trap dates back to Pigou (1943) and Patinkin (1965). In prin-
ciple, wealth eﬀects could prevent a deflation trap: if declining prices lead
to higher perceived wealth, agents will increase their spending. This can be
investigated numerically. Our simulations indicate that wealth eﬀects can
indeed stabilize the economy at ∗.
The dynamics under learning when consumers are not Ricardian are given
in Section 3.1. These describe the temporary equilibrium, and the adjust-
ment of expectations. Taken together they constitute the dynamic system
that determines the real-time evolution of the economy. Because government
bonds and real balances are state variables that aﬀect consumption and out-
put, expectations   are no longer suﬃcient statistics for the economy
and it is now not possible to characterize the dynamics of the system using
a phase diagram as in (41) and Figure 1. We therefore directly simulate the
real-time dynamics of the system under learning.
To illustrate the possibility of wealth eﬀects successfully leading the econ-
omy back to the targeted steady state we provide a numerical simulation.
Assume that initial expectations are pessimistic, with (0) = 09925 and
(0) = 09425. These expectations are below the low inflation steady state
values and therefore in the deflation trap region when households are Ricar-
dian. In the case of non-Ricardian households the evolution of output and
inflation also depends on wealth dynamics. We are interested in whether
these wealth dynamics can lead the economy to the targeted steady state.
We find that this indeed is possible, but that there is sensitivity to the tax
policy parameters and to the initial wealth of the households.
In the non-Ricardian case we slightly change the interest-rate rule (9) to
( ) =  + (∗ − 1− )
³ 
∗
´∗(∗−1)µ 
∗
¶

for small   0 so that  is bounded above 1 + . This prevents money
demand from becoming unbounded for large deflation rates and low levels
of output. This issue is irrelevant in the Ricardian case but is important in
the non-Ricardian case because of perceived wealth eﬀects. In the numerical
examples we set  = 0001, which corresponds to a floor on net interest rates
of one-tenth of one percent.
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As an illustration consider the tax function (5) with 0 = 005 and  =
−1−1+0001, so that fiscal policy is passive in the sense of Leeper (1991).18
We set  = 003 to match the fraction of real balances to consumption in the
targeted steady state (see (35)), and we set the gain parameter  = 001 The
initial values of real balances and real bonds are(0) = 075 and (0) = 077,
which are close to the values of  and  at the targeted steady state for this
tax function. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of inflation and output from
this starting point.
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Figure 2: Inflation, output dynamics with non-Ricardian consumers
Figure 2 shows actual inflation and output on horizontal and vertical axes,
respectively. There is a wide clockwise cycle where inflation and output at
first overshoot (∗ ∗) then spiral below ( ) and finally follow a cyclical
convergent path to (∗ ∗).19 In this example wealth eﬀects do lead to even-
tual convergence to the targeted steady state, in contrast to the divergent
deflationary path that would arise with Ricardian consumers. However, the
path in Figure 2 is highly cyclical, and has extended periods of low output
and substantial deflation with big swings in inflation and output.
Convergence from pessimistic initial expectations to the targeted steady
state appears to be generally robust to starting points for expectations and
18The other parameters are set at their previous values. We also set (0) = (0) and
(0) = (0). The value of  = 50 corresponds to the output coeﬃcient of linearized
Taylor rule of 15 at the intended steady state.
19Time paths of  and  also asymptotically converge to their steady state values.
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initial real bonds and real balances.20 This finding is, however, sensitive to
the value of , in that if  is decreased, for example to  = −1−1−0001 ≈
00091, then the level of bonds eventually explodes. The reason is that now
fiscal policy is active in the sense of Leeper (1991). At the unintended steady
state monetary policy is passive and learning dynamics lead the economy
towards the intended steady state where, however, both fiscal and monetary
policies are active and financial wealth levels will diverge. This leads to
instability under learning: the economy appears to move around the targeted
steady state for a period but eventually bonds follow an explosive path and
the economy diverges.21
From a policy perspective, we see that it is indeed possible for wealth
eﬀects to provide a mechanism for the economy to escape from a deflationary
situation and to return eventually to the targeted steady state. However, this
mechanism relies on consumers being non-Ricardian and on appropriate tax
policy. Furthermore, the path back to the targeted steady state is cyclical
with wide swings in inflation and output.
4 Fiscal Policies
We now examine the role of fiscal policy when large adverse expectation
shocks make deflation traps and stagnation a serious risk.22 We focus on
changes in government purchases of goods and services, rather than tax
changes with unchanged government spending, because in our set-up tax
changes by themselves are neutral if households are Ricardian. In practice,
tax changes financed by changes in government debt can have macroeco-
nomic eﬀects, e.g. if some households are liquidity constrained or are non-
20For brevity, we omit the details. For initial (0) and (0) at levels that are very high,
for example 15 times GDP or higher, we see an extended period of cycling aroung the low
steady state before eventual convergence to the targeted steady state.
21These results are not surprising in view of the (flexible-price, short decision-horizon)
results in Evans and Honkapohja (2005). In that paper under steady state learning there is
convergence to ∗ but with debt exploding under active fiscal policy. In the current paper
with non-Ricardian households the explosive debt path eventually destabilizes inflation
and output as well.
22Evans and Honkapohja (2010) show that for some points within the deflation trap
region, even committing to zero net nominal interest rates forever may be insuﬃcient for
escaping the deflation trap.
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Ricardian.23 However, our objective is to demonstrate that suitable fiscal
rules, based on temporary increases in government spending, can prevent
the economy from falling into or becoming stuck in the deflation trap and
can return the economy to the targeted steady state even if tax changes
by themselves are neutral. Therefore in this section we focus on Ricardian
households. We will return to the case of non-Ricardian consumers in the
next section.
4.1 Temporary Fiscal Stimulus
A traditional countercyclical policy for an economy facing deflation with
declining or stagnant output is a fiscal stimulus taking the form of increased
government expenditures above their normal levels for a finite time horizon,
after which they revert back to lower levels. Analysis of this type of policy has
not been done before when the economy is in a liquidity trap and the dynam-
ics are assumed to evolve in accordance with adaptive learning.24 We want to
study the eﬀectiveness of such a policy under the Ricardian assumption that
the government remains solvent in the long run, and that consumers know
and expect this. In this IH learning framework agents know the trajectory of
government expenditures, including the date at which the expenditures will
return to lower levels, and they incorporate this knowledge into their optimal
consumption and pricing decisions. The consumption function, aggregate de-
mand and the Phillips curve reflect these forward-looking expectations of the
agents.
More explicitly, consider a simple case of anticipated changes in govern-
ment policy. Suppose that there is an initial pessimistic expectations shock
that has lowered (0) and (0) suﬃciently so that the economy is in the
deflation trap region. Under normal policy the economy will fail to return
to the targeted steady state. We therefore consider fiscal policies in which
there is a temporary increase in ¯ (from its initial steady state level ¯ = ¯1),
taking the form
 =
½ ¯0 for  = 0  0
¯1 for  = 0 + 1  
23There is empirical evidence of positive impacts of tax reductions on aggregate output,
see Romer and Romer (2010).
24Anticipated future policy changes are discussed in Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra
(2009) in the context of a Ramsey model with flexible prices and without money.
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where ¯0  ¯1. Here we assume that the policy is announced and started
at  = 0 and it is credible. Agents understand that government spending
will be continued at the higher level ¯0 through period 0 and that it will be
reduced to its previous level beginning at 0 + 1.
For gross output agents are assumed to have expectations given by the
simple adaptive rules described in Section 3. For net output, however, ex-
pectations are given by
 =
½  − ¯0 for  =   0 − ¯1 for  = 0 + 1   (42)
so that agents incorporate the known future path of government spending
into their forecasts.
The variables  that appear in the Phillips curve (16), and in the
consumption function (28) are now defined according to (42). This requires
evaluating the weighted sums of  using the appropriate value of govern-
ment expenditures for each . The computations are straightforward, and
the consumption function is now given by:
 = (1− )
µ
 − ¯0 + ( − ¯0)1− (
 )−0
( )− 1 + (
 − ¯1) (
 )−0
( )− 1
¶

where  and  are the time  forecasted (constant) value of future real
interest rates and output.
For the interest rate rule (9) we set  = 25 and  = 50, a calibration
broadly consistent with the standard Taylor-rule parameters.
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Figure 3:  and  under a fiscal stimulus.
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Given a specific fiscal stimulus, we can proceed as in Section 2.4, except
that we now report real-time dynamics based on the adaptive learning rules
of Section 3. Figure 3 illustrates one example of the dynamics of output and
inflation for 0 = 6, and with ¯0 = 021, ¯1 = 02. Thus there is a fiscal
stimulus, taking the form of a 5% increase in government spending for six
periods. We set initial expectations at [0] = 09425 and [0] = 0993.
These are in the deflation trap region, and without the fiscal stimulus there
would be falling inflation and output (compare to the steady state values
at the end of Section 3.2.1). Under the fiscal stimulus the economy instead
converges to the intended steady state, though after a wide swing that takes
inflation well above the intended steady state. As noted in connection with
Figure 1, under normal policy the convergence dynamics inside the corridor
of stability are inherently cyclical. This feature also appears after the end
of the temporary stimulus, when expectations overshoot the values of the
targeted steady state.
An important feature of the policy is that the length of the temporary
fiscal stimulus is crucial for its eﬃcacy. For example, if, holding ¯0 = 021,
¯1 = 02, we set 0 = 1 2 or 0 ≥ 37 then the fiscal stimulus does not enable
the economy to return to the targeted steady state. In fact, the size of the
stimulus and the degree of pessimism of expectations also matter for the
eﬃcacy of fiscal stimulus. We now examine this more systematically.25
We consider four diﬀerent degrees of pessimism of expectations as follows:
Mild:  = 0993 and  = 09425.
Large:  = 0991 and  = 09425
Severe:  = 0985 and  = 09425
Extreme:  = 0985 and  = 09.
We find that a temporary fiscal stimulus always works for a range of govern-
ment spending ¯0 and length of stimulus 0. For 0 = 1, a temporary fiscal
stimulus works for suﬃciently large ¯0 Often, increasing length of stimulus
0 somewhat allows the use of a smaller value of ¯0 to achieve convergence
to the intended steady state.
Some specific results are as follows:
Mild pessimism: ¯0 = 0205 yields desired convergence for stimulus of
25Also the parameter  describing statistical forecasting horizon aﬀects the quantitative
results. Through period  +  agents use their forecasts (), whereas after  +  , they
assume that the real interest rate has reverted to normal and set +() = −1 for    .
As indicated earlier, we set  = 28 i.e. agents think it will take 7 years for real interest
rates to return to normal steady state.
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length 0 = 11     22, while with this 0, the policy fails if 0 is outside this
range. A smaller value of ¯0 = 0204 is never eﬀective while ¯0 = 25 makes
the 0 range larger.
Large pessimism: A large value of spending ¯0 = 025 delivers desired
convergence for 0 = 1     37. A smaller value ¯0 = 021 fails.
Severe pessimism: With 0 = 1, ¯0 = 034 is eﬀective.
Extreme pessimism: With 0 = 5, ¯0 = 08 is eﬀective.
Thus, the fiscal stimulus must be adequate in size and length to push
the economy out of the deflation trap region. The intuition for these results
is that the demand stimulus from a temporary increase in  outweighs the
partially oﬀsetting reduced consumption from the higher present value of
taxes, which for Ricardian households equals the present value of government
spending. A permanent increase in ¯ in this set-up does not lift the economy
out of the deflation trap, because the permanently higher taxes exactly oﬀset
the increase in government spending. In contrast, a large enough increase in
government spending for a limited period will add enough stimulus to lead
the economy back to the targeted steady state. We note that the tax rule (5)
implies that the long-run debt to GDP ratio is unaﬀected by the temporary
stimulus.
4.2 Fiscal Austerity
Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that a carefully designed restrictive fiscal
policy can in certain cases lift the economy out of the liquidity trap, provided
it is applied for a suﬃcient long period of time. We now examine this pos-
sibility for the diﬀerent degrees of pessimism of expectations.26 The results
for the diﬀerent degrees of pessimism are as follows:
Mild pessimism: cutting government spending to ¯0 = 019 is eﬀective in
moving the economy out of the deflation trap when the length of the policy
is in the range 0 ≥ 33 but this policy fails for smaller values of 027 A more
severe policy ¯0 = 015 is eﬀective also for 0 ≥ 28.
Large pessimism: ¯0 = 019 is eﬀective for length 0 ≥ 67.
26In this section the forecasting horizon is set at  = 60 For shorter horizons, for
example for  = 28 fiscal austerity seems to be ineﬀective. On the other hand, temporary
fiscal stimuli continue to be eﬀective for large values of 
27We note that if ¯0 = 019 and 0 = 50 the policy induces fairly large fluctuations in
output and inflation compared to a corresponding case of stimulus shown in Figure 3. The
ranges of fluctuations are  ∈ (0886 0990) and  ∈ (0986 1142).
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Severe pessimism: ¯0 = 015 is eﬀective for length 0 ≥ 100.
Extreme pessimism: Fiscal austerity is never eﬀective.
In terms of the length of policy 0 stimulus and austerity policies have
an interesting contrast. The eﬃcacy of the former requires a limited duration
whereas a very long period of the latter is necessary. In all our examples the
eﬃcacy of stimulus policies imply that the austerity policies of same absolute
magnitude and duration are not eﬀective and vice versa. However, there
are also cases for which neither policy is eﬀective for certain intermediate
durations. As an example consider the stimulus policy ¯0 = 025 under mild
pessimism for a forecasting horizon  = 60 A stimulus policy with 0 ≥ 25
is ineﬀective in lifting the economy out of the deflation trap as is an austerity
policy of ¯0 = 015 for 0  28.
In general, eﬃcacy of austerity policies is more sensitive to the degree of
pessimism of expectations as suggested by the following subtle intuition. If
the economy is in a region in which the ex-ante real interest rate factor is less
than −1 then the consumption function dictates an increase in consumption
flow, stemming from a fixed permanent decrease in taxes, that is larger than
the decrease in . The present value is the same when measured by , but
because   −1, households will substitute toward current consumption.
Formally consider a permanent change in government spending to ¯0  ¯1
Then actual output, for given expectations, is given by
 = ¯0 + (−1 − 1)( − ¯0)( − 1)  ¯1 + (−1 − 1)( − ¯1)( − 1)
provided −1    This eﬀect only holds for a range of  in which monetary
policy delivers a low . For larger deflation rates, however, i.e.   0985,
this policy cannot work for initial expectations in which () falls over time
under normal policy. Thus for suﬃciently pessimistic initial expectations we
would expect permanent or very long cuts in government spending to fail as
a policy that takes the economy to a steady state.
The above analysis also implies that under adaptive learning, whether
households are Ricardian or not, a fiscal stimulus can give rise to a “fiscal
multiplier” that is quite diﬀerent from the multiplier under a policy of fiscal
austerity, depending on the magnitude and duration of the policy and on
the initial expectations. This suggests that in an adaptive learning context,
results of empirical studies of the fiscal multiplier will be sensitive to initial
expectations and to the duration and magnitude of policies.
In this section we have seen that the success of the temporary fiscal policy
in general depends on fine tuning the magnitude, direction and duration of
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the policy. We next look at an endogenous switching rule for government
spending that eliminates deflation and stagnation and that also appears to
have reasonable performance overall.
5 A Fiscal Switching Rule
In Section 4.1 we found that a suitably designed temporary stimulus is ef-
fective in getting the economy out of the deflation trap. This is in line with
testimony by Lawrence Summers to the Joint Economic Committee hearing
on January 16, 2008, that fiscal “stimulus program should be timely, targeted
and temporary.” Section 4.1 showed that for a successful policy it is essential
to get the parameters in the right range. This leads us to a discussion of
whether a more “automatic” policy rule can be designed for this purpose.
To prevent deflationary spirals or deflation with declining or stagnant
output, we now explore a temporary fiscal stimulus policy designed to ensure
that expected inflation eventually exceeds some threshold ˜  . Here the
length of the stimulus is dictated by the state of the economy. Specifically,
if   ˜ the government sets  ≥ ¯ as needed to achieve an output level 
such that realized inflation  exceeds expected inflation  . In addition, if ≥ ˜, the government sets  ≥ ¯ as needed to ensure that  exceeds the
threshold ˜.28
We remark that the idea of a lower threshold for inflation and increased
government spending to ensure that actual inflation stays above the thresh-
old was suggested in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2010). The rule proposed here improves upon the earlier ideas
in that it focuses squarely on inflation expectations and the new rule leads to
less extreme fluctuations in  than rules used in the cited earlier papers.29
To implement this fiscal switching policy, we assume that the government
monitors expectations. Given expectations, it can set  to achieve a level of 
28If   ˜ we set  to ensure that  ≥  + and if  ≥ ˜ we set  to ensure that ≥ ˜ + , for some small   0. In numerical illustrations we set  = 0005. Note
that if  ≥ ˜ and  ≥ ˜ for  = ¯ then the rule sets  = ¯.
29We require a much smaller increase in  when the trigger is activated than Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2010). In the latter the trigger
was simply a lower bound on actual inflation as opposed to expected inflation, and  was
raised to achieve this bound. In our case with Ricardian consumers the  ratio goes
up from 02 to 0.26 while in Evans and Honkapohja (2010) the ratio is much higher, going
from 02 to 034 if identical calibrations are used.
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using equation (30). In eﬀect the government observes inflation monthly, and
would be able to adjust spending in order to maintain ˜   on a quarterly
basis. Automatic stabilizers, like unemployment benefits and other income
subsidy programs triggered by output thresholds may be useful, but may also
be insuﬃcient. It should be emphasized that if expectations turn substan-
tially pessimistic, government expenditures triggered by an output threshold
may not be able to prevent deflation traps (see Evans, Guse, and Honkapo-
hja (2008)). This could happen even at zero nominal rates if the ex-ante
real interest rate rises and depresses private consumption as a result of sub-
stitution between private consumption and government spending with gross
output remaining at the threshold level. Therefore we focus here on fiscal
switching rules based on thresholds for inflationary expectations. Triggered
government expenditures could involve for example infrastructure or research
projects activated at times of deflationary expectations and designed to avoid
fiscal lags.
From equations (31), (32) and (33) it is apparent that  can be chosen to
attain the required level of inflation. This procedure ensures that eventually
 ≥ ˜We simulate this economy using the same parameters used in Figure
3 above for Ricardian consumers, except that we now use the fiscal switching
rule.30 For the numerical results in this section we set ˜ =  + 0005 =
09981
Two points should be noted about this form of fiscal policy. First, it is
not necessary to decide in advance the magnitude and duration of the fiscal
stimulus. Second, in contrast to the preceding section we now do not assume
that agents know the future path of government spending. Instead agents use
adaptive learning to forecast the future values of their net income in addition
to forecasts of inflation and output.
30In the section we use net rather than gross output in the interest-rate rule, because
of the potential large variation in gross output due to government spending. The results
presented here are not significantly aﬀected by this issue.
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Figure 4:  and  under a fiscal switching rule, Ricardian households
We start with the case in which consumers are Ricardian. In contrast
to the economy depicted in Figure 1, the fiscal switching rule eliminates the
unintended steady state with the inflation rate : the path starting in the
vicinity of  converges to the intended steady state. This is illustrated in
Figure 4. A strong fiscal stimulus generates a steep rise in output and lifts
the economy out of the deflation trap and the economy eventually converges
to the intended steady state. For initial expectations in Figure 4, which are
the same as in Figure 3, the dynamics would be unstable without the fiscal
switching rule. Compared to the policy used in Figure 3, the main diﬀerence
is that there is a much stronger but shorter fiscal stimulus under the fiscal
switching rule. There is a also a brief small fiscal stimulus used at a later
date when inflation again is a low values.
In all four cases of pessimism illustrated in Section 4 our switching rule
generates paths that converge to the targeted steady state, and the perfor-
mance of these rules is comparable or somewhat better. The main advantage
of the fiscal switching rule is that it provides a robust policy for ensuring that
the economy does not get stuck in the deflation trap, and it does so using
an “automatic” fiscal policy that does not require tuning to the economic
situation.
The results with non-Ricardian consumers are similar: the fiscal switching
rule eliminates the unintended steady state  and ensures convergence to
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the targeted steady state. Figure 5, using the same parameters used for the
non-Ricardian case of Figure 3, illustrates these results.
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Figure 5:  and  dynamics under fiscal switching rule, non-Ricardian
households
Although in the non-Ricardian case, both paths with and without policy
show cyclical convergence, the path without policy is more volatile. Table 1
illustrates these results for the case of extreme pessimism, i.e. :  = 0985
and  = 09.
Table 1: Non-Ricardian Households
Without policy With policy
maximum inflation,  1.371 1.140
minimum output,  0.805 0.900
Thus, even in the non-Ricardian case in which wealth eﬀects do eventually
return the economy to the intended steady states, the fiscal switching policy
improves performance.
As illustrated for both the Ricardian and Non-Ricardian cases examined,
the fiscal switching rule, together with our interest rate rule, yields conver-
gence to the targeted steady state after an initial overshooting of inflation
and output.31 The overshooting arises from the necessary big initial policy
responses that are needed to counteract the initial pessimistic expectations
31We also checked that with this combination of rules there is convergence to the targeted
steady state from even more pessimistic initial expectations.
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which tend to be inertial under adaptive learning. While our focus in this
section is fiscal policy, we can explore whether more aggressive monetary poli-
cies working in conjunction with fiscal policy can improve stabilization. If
we modify the coeﬃcients of the Taylor rule we can dampen the fluctuations
of output and inflation seen in Figure 4. This is achieved with significant de-
partures from coeﬃcients typically used in the literature and policy practice,
in particular by dramatically increasing the response of the nominal interest
rate to the output gap. For example, if we set  = 1500, for the pessimistic
initial expectations  = 0993 and  = 09425 used in Figure 4, we can
reduce the overshooting of the inflation rate to about one percentage point
above target and eliminate almost entirely the undershooting of output.32
In summary, our analysis suggests that one policy which might be used
to combat stagnation and deflation, in the face of pessimistic expectations,
would consist of a fiscal switching rule combined with a Taylor-type rule for
monetary policy. The fiscal switching rule applies when expected or actual
inflation falls below a critical value. The rule specifies increased government
spending in such a way that expected inflation is ensured to exceed eventu-
ally the critical threshold. This part of the policy eliminates the unintended
steady state and makes sure that the economy does not get stuck in a regime
of deflation and stagnation. Furthermore, unlike the temporary fiscal poli-
cies discussed in the previous section, the switching rules do not require fine
tuning and are triggered automatically. Remarkably, our simulations indi-
cate that this combination of policies is successful regardless of whether the
households are Ricardian or non-Ricardian.
6 Conclusion
We have studied how the an economy can fall into a deflation or low inflation
trap with declining or stagnant output, and explored the design of policies
to avoid such outcomes. Under the perfect foresight view, simply announc-
ing appropriate money growth and/or fiscal policies can in principle avoid
low inflation. The eﬀectiveness of such policies, however, depends on the
assumption of perfect foresight, on policy credibility, and on wealth eﬀects
to eliminate all equilibria except the targeted ∗ steady state. Furthermore
32In terms of the Taylor rule linearized at the targeted steady state, the coeﬃcient on
the output gap corresponding to  = 50 is 15, and for  = 1500 it is 45.
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such policies are “too powerful” under perfect foresight: bad outcomes never
happen.
If we adopt a more plausible adaptive learning view, outcomes with low
inflation and output are still possible. We find that policies of temporary
fiscal stimulus, and in some cases fiscal austerity, can eliminate liquidity traps
and can lead the economy back to its intended steady state. However, such
policies require careful fine tuning of the magnitude, direction and duration
of the policy. A “fiscal switching rule” that automatically triggers a stimulus
of high government expenditures when inflation or expected inflation falls
below a critical threshold is equally eﬀective in stabilizing the economy, but
does not require complicated and discretionary fine tuning, and therefore
seems preferable.
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7 Appendix 1: Private sector optimization
Recall the form of the utility function for household-producer
 = 
1−1
1− 1 +

1− 2
µ−1

¶1−2
− 
1+
1 +  −

2
µ 
−1 − 1
¶2
and the constraints
 = − −  −Υ +−1−1 +−1−1 −1 +  
 =  1
µ

¶−
and  = 
µ

¶−

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We compute the derivatives with respect to (− 1)-dated variables

−1 = 
−1 −1 + (−1−1 )−2 

−1 = 
−1 −1−1 

−1 = 
µ 
−1 − 1
¶µ 
−1
¶
1
−1
and with respect to -dated variables

 =

 = −
−1 

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1
−1 
The Euler equations are

 + 
+1
 = 0

 + 
+1
 = 0

 + 
+1
 = 0
The second equation is just the consumption Euler equation (11), while com-
bining the first and second equations yields the money demand function (12).
The third Euler equation implies one-step nonlinear the Phillips curve (10).
Next, we examine the transversality condition for optimal price setting.
Using Kamihigashi (2003), the transversality condition
lim→∞
[Ψ( − ˆ)] ≤ 0
where {ˆ} denotes the optimal pricing policy and  is a perturbation
from the optimum, is a necessary condition for optimality under some regu-
larity conditions (in particular, an interior optimum is required).33 Here we
33For brevity, we do not consider these conditions in detail.
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use the short-hand notation
Ψ = (1− ) ( )−  −1
³
ˆ
´−
−
³

´
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³
ˆ
´−(1+)−1 − Ã ˆˆ−1 − 1
!
1
ˆ−1 
Note that Ψ =  at the optimum. Using the Euler equation for price
setting we have
lim→∞
[Ψ( − ˆ)] (43)
= lim→∞

"
−
Ã
ˆ+1
ˆ − 1
!
ˆ+1
ˆ
#Ã

ˆ − 1
!
≤ 0
for all permitted . Since we are dealing with necessary condition for
local max, the perturbations  can be taken to be in a suﬃciently small
neighborhood of ˆ. We require that ˆ remains close to 1 but it can be
smaller or bigger than 1. This leads to the requirement
0 = lim→∞

"

Ã
ˆ+1
ˆ − 1
!
ˆ+1
ˆ
#
=  lim→∞
ˆ+1 = 0
which gives the TVC (14) in the text.
8 Appendix 2: Asymmetric Price Adjustment
If the costs of price adjustment are asymmetric and are higher for reductions
in prices, then this can provide a lower bound on deflation.34 Consider for
example the case where the cost of price adjustment in the utility function
takes the form
 =
½ 
2
( − 1)2 for  ≥ 
+∞ for   
34See Evans (2013) for the stagnation regime.
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where  = −1. To examine the implications of asymmetric price-
adjustment costs, we return to the case of Ricardian consumers discussed in
Section 2.4. The temporary equilibrium map for inflation is modified to
 =
½ 2(  ) for 2(  ) ≥  for 2(  )  
Because the Ricardian case is a forward-looking two-dimensional system with
adaptive learning, one can illustrate the possible results using phase diagrams
showing the expectational learning dynamics. There are three cases:
1.   . In this case ∗ is globally stable, since    is no longer
possible.
2.    The deflation trap continues to exist. If  −  is small,
however, in the region      there is gradually falling output.
3.  = . The stagnation regime. In this case there can be convergence
to any 0     with  = .
Figures 6 illustrates the phase diagram for the E-stability diﬀerential
equations in ( )-space for the case    in which a deflation trap
continues to exist. In this case the targeted steady state ∗ is locally stable.
However, if output expectations are low, the economy may converge to the
trap even if initially inflation expectations are low but above . The main
diﬀerence from the symmetric price-adjustment cost set-up examined in the
paper is that deflation is now bounded from below at rate . Thus, in this
case, persistently low and falling output is compatible with steady deflation
at low levels.
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Figure 6: asymmetric cost adjustment with   
We briefly describe the other two cases of asymmetric adjustment costs.
In all cases the targeted steady state is locally stable under learning. If
 = , there is also a locally stable continuum of steady states at  =
 =  and   , where  is the level of output associated with the
usual  steady state. E-stability dynamics indicate that under learning the
economy can converge to any point on the continuum from initial conditions
(0) &  and (0) suﬃciently low. Similar convergence to the continuum
can happen for initial (0) .  and (0) suﬃciently low. In the case   
the economy under learning is globally stable at the targeted steady state
∗. However, for  only slightly above , pessimistic initial expectations
((0) (0)) can lead to extended periods of low output and mild deflation
before inflation expectations are pulled up towards  and a recovery begins.
As noted, for example, by Bullard (2010), we do observe economies ex-
hibiting extended periods of very low inflation or mild deflation. The cases
 =  and    show that steady mild deflation is consistent with a de-
flation trap region that leads to persistently falling or persistently low levels
of output. The analysis of fiscal policy provided in this paper could easily be
extended to the various cases of asymmetric price adjustment.
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